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Abstract 
This article addresses the roles of intellectuals in the shaping of cultural policy. Three 
distinct but interrelated political levels are discussed: the EU, the UK as a member state 
and Scotland as a stateless nation. The cultural and political space of the European Union 
is contradictory: it has a cultural presence but member states have full cultural 
competence. The EU’s public sphere is fragmented, poised between regulation and 
federation. The member state therefore remains the principal focus for analysis of cultural 
policy debates. Next, a variety of theoretical positions on the intellectuals and the 
strategic uses of expertise in a ‘knowledge society’ is explored, illustrating how the 
cultural policy field is typically constituted. The article goes on to discuss how 
intellectuals in the UK have shaped government policy on the ‘creative economy’, 
underlining the importance of a New Labour ‘policy generation’ in taking ideas forward 
that have been globally influential as well as in Scotland. A discussion of stateless 
nationhood is the backdrop to showing how the Nationalists in power inherited their 
Labour-LibDem predecessors’ approach to developing a new cultural institution, Creative 
Scotland. This underlines Scotland’s deep policy dependency on creative economy ideas 
fashioned in London.  
 
 
Cultural policy, states and intellectuals 
                                                 
1This article draws on ‘The Politics of Cultural Policy’, my inaugural lecture at the 
University of Glasgow, delivered on 25 March 2009.  
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Cultural policy is made at the intersection between culture and politics. While its scope 
and purposes may vary through space and time, contemporary cultural policy 
characteristically brings diverse ways of life and modes of cultural production, 
distribution and consumption into relation with the institutionalised form of the state. 
Cultural policy broadly understood is moulded by the tensions between profit and 
aesthetic value, by continually shifting boundaries between the private and the public, by 
the vagaries of social and cultural inclusion and exclusion, and so forth.  
 
In many countries, contemporary cultural policy has a major economic and social 
dimension, as current talk of the creative and digital economy underlines. In some 
formulations it may embrace institutional arenas such as education, the arts, and 
broadcasting. What is key, however, for present purposes, is that in most practical 
respects cultural policy is played out within the political systems and the public spheres 
of states. Consequently, its relation to questions of national identity is inescapable.  
 
In contemporary Europe, states face a dual challenge: on the one hand, that of 
managing their internal cultural diversity and on the other, addressing the strains placed 
on ideas of cultural sovereignty and the national public sphere engendered by uneven 
processes of ‘Europeanization’ principally resulting from the expansion of the European 
Union. Conceptions of national identity are inherently contested and these struggles have 
become especially acute in Europe over the question of migration and what might be the 
limits of multiculturalism.  
 
Culture is a ‘subsidiary’ matter for the EU’s Member States. In this domain, 
Article 151 of the Treaty on European Union restricts the EU’s actions. Notwithstanding 
this, the Union’s presence in the cultural field has slowly grown. In recent years, for 
instance, it has launched the Culture 2000 programme (which ran from 2000-2006) and 
the Culture Programme (which runs from 2007-2013). The field of culture within the 
EU’s remit, arguably, ‘is becoming broader and includes…areas such as citizenship, 
economic development, social policy and education’. The EU has become an 
international actor in the cultural domain, as is evident from the Union’s negotiations 
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over the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity.2 From one perspective, therefore, it 
could be held that elements of a European cultural space are beginning to emerge. But it 
is a contradictory one, for as Abram de Swaan has remarked, within the EU ‘intellectual 
exchange is hampered by the barriers of language and by the constraints of national 
frameworks’.3  
 
Alongside the contradictory Europeanization of cultural space, the question of 
whether the EU might constitute a common politico-communicative space has been 
repeatedly addressed. Arguably, this has preconditions, if in not a common culture then at 
least in a widely shared, boundary-transcending, political culture. Elsewhere, I have 
suggested that the EU remains stuck somewhere between being a regulatory entity and 
forming a federation. With elements of each of these political forms currently coexisting, 
a fractured political domain is the inevitable outcome. As the mediated public sphere is 
still overwhelmingly dominated by states, and a meaningful transnational politics does 
not yet exist, it is not surprising that the prospects of a common European public sphere 
remain distant. The Euro-sphere is overwhelmingly constituted by the EU’s institutions 
and the elite interlocutors focused on its functioning.4  
 
The complex dynamics and the unresolved debate resulting from Europeanization 
underline the limitations of taking the state as an analytical framework for the analysis of 
culture. The idea of bounded cultural sovereignty is plainly challenged by global flows of 
culture and communication and transnational systems of governance. So-called nation-
                                                 
2 Patricia  Dewey, ‘Transnational Cultural Policymaking in the European Union’, The 
Journal of Arts Management, Law, and Society, 38(2): 99-118. Quotation from p.104.  
3 Abram De Swaan , ‘The European Void: the Democratic Deficit as a Cultural 
Deficiency’, pp. 135-153 in John Erik Fossum and Philip Schlesinger, eds, The European 
Union and the Public Sphere: A communicative space in the making? (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2007). Quotation from p. 149. 
4 John Erik Fossum, and Philip Schlesinger, ‘The European Union and the public sphere: 
a communicative space in the making’, pp. 1-19 in Fossum and Schlesinger, op.cit. 
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states are often actually constituted as multiethnic and multicultural societies. The 
boundaries of states, moreover, do not necessarily coincide with their component nations. 
Such considerations add to the complexity of how we must conceive of the shaping of 
cultural policy.  
 
The development of a national culture is as much an intellectual project as a 
political one. Zygmunt Bauman has argued that modern intellectuals developed with the 
emergence of culture itself, culture being conceived as an autonomous space for action.5 
Bauman has described intellectuals as a key expert stratum that developed with the 
Enlightenment. Their initial role, he argues, was that of ‘legislator’. They articulated the 
ideology of a new order impatient of diversity and backwardness and were in the 
vanguard of seeking centralised polities and cultures. In post-modernity, where 
epistemological certainties have collapsed, Bauman suggests, the role of intellectuals has 
shifted from legislator to ‘interpreter’, to a more modest role of making sense of cultures; 
they are largely disconnected from power. 
 
Edward Said also set out to identify ‘a specific public role in society’ for the 
intellectual.6 Where Bauman’s argument is sociological Said’s is normative. The choice 
for Said is either one of working inside the power structure or of being powerless. He 
urges public intellectuals to side with the weak and the dispossessed. His conception of 
the intellectual is one of ‘speaking truth to power’. For Said, to speak within a national 
discourse is to occupy a prison house that limits our discursive independence and 
horizons. He therefore celebrates the role of the intellectual as an outsider. To stand 
outside, he suggests, offers both epistemological and moral advantages. Consequently, 
exile – both actual and metaphorical – is the only state that fits true intellectual 
endeavour.  Said, of course, was an exile; and so too is Bauman, although he has not 
argued that this condition confers special advantages everywhere and always.  
                                                 
5 Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity (London and New York: Routledge, 
1992).  
6 Edward Said, Representations of the Intellectual (London: Vintage, 1994). 
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Both Bauman’s and Said’s positions are highly questionable. Bauman’s valuable 
insight is that the breakdown of traditional orders turns culture into a distinct sphere of 
action, a new playground. Culture becomes something to be managed and it is therefore 
central to intellectuals’ self-conceptions, because culture is their living space. But 
contemporary intellectuals are not all simply interpreters. There is good empirical 
evidence that the desire to legislate for how culture should be shaped and turned to profit 
remains very powerful in our times. Some intellectuals do indeed find ways of acting as 
legislators, even if that often means shaping legislation through interpretation. So the 
ideological struggle over visions of the cultural order is not innocent but has major 
consequences, particularly where those who articulate ideological visions are close to the 
centres of power.  
 
Said has written eloquently on the consolations of outsider-ness. According to his 
exilic ideal we should contribute to the public debate as outsiders. This view derives from 
a classic image of the public intellectual as engagé and dates from the Dreyfus affaire of 
the 1890s.  However, this limiting conception polarises intellectuals into the co-opted v 
the free, the clean v the corrupt, the principled opponent v the compliant bootlicker, and 
the saint v the sinner. Although it is neat, this schema distorts the actual complexity of 
how contemporary intellectuals (academics included) address the world of policy and 
politics. 
 
Yet another exile, the critical theorist Theodor Adorno, provides a more grounded 
view on the role of expertise in cultural policy.7 Analysing what he disparagingly called 
‘the culture industry’, Adorno thought that intellectuals were mostly ‘servile’. He loathed 
the idea of an administered culture. Nevertheless, Adorno believed that a critically self-
aware cultural policy was feasible and that expertise could be used ‘for the protection of 
cultural matters from the realm of control by the market’.8 In short, Adorno thought 
                                                 
7 Theodor Adorno , The Culture Industry (London: Routledge, 1991). 
8 ibid. 112. 
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experts working within institutions to pursue culturally progressive ends could – in 
Bauman’s terms - be legislators rather than just interpreters. My own research into the 
formation of ‘creative economy’ policy supports this view, although we might dispute 
whether the ends pursued are necessarily ‘progressive’.9  
 
What might entitle intellectuals to intervene in policy debate today? Under 
contemporary conditions, policy-relevant expertise has become a key criterion for 
credible entry into debate. This has become increasingly the case since the mandarin 
political commentator, Walter Lippmann, writing nearly nine decades ago, astutely noted 
the strategic advantages enjoyed by experts in influencing decision-making in the 
increasingly complex structures of US government and administration.10 Such 
complexity, Lippmann observed, demonstrated ‘the need for interposing some form of 
expertness between the private citizen and the vast environment in which he is 
entangled’.11 In other words, he endorsed a special place for a particular kind of 
intellectual elite in policy formation and implementation. 
 
Suitable credentials may be established in numerous ways. In academia, for 
instance, expertise is built upon research and scholarship, as well as based on the 
practical experience of advising and engaging in both public and private arenas. But none 
of this offers a guarantee of making one’s voice heard. Rather, the possession of expertise 
merely establishes a necessary condition for the articulation of relevant perspectives for a 
debate on policy. 
 
                                                 
9 Philip Schlesinger, ‘Creativity: from discourse to doctrine’, Screen 48(3) 2007: 377-
387; ‘Creativity and the experts: New Labour, think tanks and the policy process’, 
International Journal of Press/Politics 14(3) 2009: 3-20.  
10 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961 [1922])  
375.  
11 ibid. 378. 
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That is because the stage army of discourse shapers tends to be rather small. Even 
in the mainstream of policy debate and commentary, few public intellectuals achieve 
really significant and sustained access to the airwaves and the newspaper columns, or – in 
that current mark of the digital age - enjoy the status of a blogger with influence. As 
Régis Debray pointed out some thirty years ago, the post World War II rise of celebrity 
media intellectuals created a star system for the few. The overall significance of the 
university as a widespread source of legitimate knowledge consequently diminished.12 
The growing centrality of popular media has changed the rules of access to the public 
sphere and transformed the nature of a successful performance.  
 
There have been repeated attempts to characterise the changing nature of 
expertise and intellectual life in our times. In the late 1970s, the sociologist Alvin 
Gouldner wrote about the emergence of a new powerful class of symbol-manipulating 
intellectuals immersed in the ‘culture of critical discourse’.13 In similar vein, at the start 
of the noughties, the celebrity economic policy guru, Richard Florida hailed the rise and 
flight of the ‘creative class’, this time to admiring gasps of official credulity as 
governments around the world sought to install competitive creative economies – on 
which, more shortly.14 
 
Such arguments about how to situate the intellectuals relate to structural changes 
in capitalism since World War II and the emergence of a so-called ‘knowledge economy’. 
Economic restructuring has changed how expertise is valued and discussed. Gouldner and 
                                                 
12 Régis Debray, Le Pouvoir Intellectuel (Paris: Ramsay, 1979).  
13 Alvin Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class (London: 
MacMillan1979).  
14 Richard Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books, 2002); 
The Flight of the Creative Class (New York: HarperCollins, 2005).  
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Florida – like Daniel Bell before them15 - have been part of a tradition of trying to paint 
new pictures of class and power as industrial society is left increasingly behind.  
 
However, if intellectuals have become members of an increasingly dominant 
knowledge or creative class, one can only observe that within that class, power and 
influence are unevenly distributed. For those outside the magic circles of government 
favour, it is hard to be heard in the world of cultural policy formation and harder still to 
have effects. That is because the shaping of such policy has become both more 
competitive and more complex. This has particular import for academics. The 
multiplication of cultural and communication management consultancies, the expansion 
of special advisers in government, the growth of in-house research teams inside 
communications regulators, the development of specialist cultural, media and 
communications business journalism - all have recast the space available to the academy 
to make its views known and be taken seriously. It is into this intensified framework of 
competition in the attention structures of the public sphere that academics’ attempts at 
opinion formation have to fight their way. 
 
In his broad-ranging conception of how expertise might be mobilised for the 
public good, Walter Lippmann, argued for an ideal of intellectual disinterest.16 One 
World War later, the leading sociologist, Robert K. Merton, reflecting on the role of 
social research in the formation of policy, inflected Lippmann’s stance towards the ideal 
of professionalism. ‘The role of the expert’, he wrote, ‘always includes an important 
fiduciary component.’ This entails ‘the responsible exercise of specialized competence by 
experts’.17  
                                                 
15 Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
1973).  
16 Lippmann, op.cit,  375, 382, 397. 
17 Robert K. Merton, ‘The Role of Applied Research in the Formation of Policy: A 
Research Memorandum’, Philosophy of Social Science 16(3) July 1949: 161-181. 
Quotation from p.167. 
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Such views about disinterest and professionalism depend on one’s taking up a 
normative position as to the desirable comportment of a class of experts with a public 
role to play in influencing and shaping debates on matters of public policy. Oppositional 
critique à la Said, therefore, is only one of the available options.  
  
If we consider contemporary debates on culture, academics are commonly active 
in a wide range of arenas ranging from music to art history, from museology to media 
and communications. In the UK, for reasons shortly to be described, such engagement in 
the public domain is likely to become even more widespread. However, producing 
research and opining in the media (the latter being vouchsafed to a relative few) is a 
different matter from exercising influence over policy formulation and implementation. 
Real influence over policy thinking is generally based in access to institutionalised power 
and, in this respect, academics face active crowding out by other intellectuals. 
 
On rare occasions, the professor might become a minister of culture, the chairman 
of a regulatory body or the head of a cultural institution.18 Or perhaps become the author 
of a report that shifts the terms of reference for thinking about the public funding of a 
major cultural field such as broadcasting.19 The openings to influence are much more 
                                                 
18 Joan Manuel Tresserras and Ramón Zallo, both professors of communication, are 
cultural councillors in the Catalan and Basque governments, respectively; this equates to 
ministerial office in the autonomous governments concerned. Lord (David) Currie, an 
academic economist, was first chairman of the UK communications regulator, Ofcom. A 
former academic economist, Sir Michael Lyons, chairs the BBC Trust. Farrel Corcoran, a 
professor of communications at Dublin City University, chaired the Irish state 
broadcaster, RTE. Ib Bondebjerg, a professor of communications at the University of 
Copenhagen, chaired the Danish Film Institute.  
19 In the UK, the outstanding example is the Report of the committee on financing the 
BBC, chaired by the academic economist, Sir Alan Peacock, which fundamentally 
reshaped debate about public service broadcasting. 
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modest for most academics acting as applied public intellectuals. The production and 
publication of research can make a contribution to public debate if the right kind of 
attention is paid to its accessible dissemination. Academics might also decide to join 
boards and commissions, to supply expert advice to governments and agencies or 
parliamentary committees, make submissions to public inquiries, contribute 
commentaries to the media, or set up a blog, and so forth.  
 
Because universities give them considerable space, academics are well placed to 
make a disinterested contribution to public policy, on the lines envisaged by Walter 
Lippmann. Disinterest does not imply a lack of commitment to values and ideals. It is 
about the stance taken – about whether or not benefits are sought from advice and 
whether or not that is a prime motivating force.  
 
In the UK, the desire to demonstrate engagement with the public domain might 
well become more widely entrenched in coming years, as there is ever-growing pressure 
from public funding bodies for academics to satisfy the interests of so-called ‘users’ and 
‘stakeholders’ – or in the latest lingo, to have a demonstrable ‘impact’.20 Now that the 
fashion is changing, what used to be called ‘knowledge transfer’ is today more often 
termed ‘knowledge exchange’, to convey the idea of a mutually modifying effect in the 
communication between academics and ‘key stakeholders’ such as business and 
government. Contributing measurable ‘public value’ in exchange for public funding has 
increasingly become a key objective both for governments. Cultural bodies and 
universities operating in the prevalent culture of accountability and accounting that is our 
common lot. If manifest public engagement is set to increase due to the pressures to 
demonstrate the utility of research in every field – the human sciences included - this will 
make increasingly acute how to address the question of the institutional capture of 
academics by the policy world of government departments, quangos and commercial 
                                                 
20 For an idea of how the UK’s Arts and Humanities Research Council is addressing this 
question, see http://www.ahrc.ac.uk/FundedResearch/Pages/ImpactAssessment.aspx 
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interests. An inevitable by-product of increased engagement will be an increase in those 
destined to marginality in the competitive market place of influence already outlined. 
  
A creative nation? 
So how is intellectual power mobilised in today’s cultural policy debates? Contrary to 
Bauman, I wish to argue that intellectuals still desire – and some have the capacity – to 
‘legislate’, although most are indeed relegated to the role of ‘interpreter’. To illustrate my 
argument, I shall focus on some current developments in cultural policy in the UK and 
Scotland – those concerning the so-called creative economy.  
 
In 1998, shortly after Tony Blair’s New Labour government first took up office, 
the Department for Culture, Media and Sport promoted the idea of the ‘creative 
industries’. These, we were told, had their ‘origin in individual creativity, skill and 
talent…which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and 
exploitation of intellectual property’.21 This new policy emphasised individuals as 
creators and subordinated culture to economics. In short, the argument fell completely in 
line with the neo-liberal thinking that has dominated the UK since the days of Margaret 
Thatcher’s governments. The creative industries do not constitute a concept; they are 
made up of an arbitrary grouping of diverse cultural, communicative and technological 
practices. The designated thirteen are these: advertising, architecture, art and the antiques 
market, crafts, design, designer fashion, film, interactive leisure software, music, the 
performing arts, publishing, software and television and radio.  
 
Creative industries policy made in London is circling the globe and has been 
imported into many countries, as though it were a ready-made conceptual toolkit with 
which you can solve the problem of how to make creativity profitable. Although the 
policy has been repeatedly revised and is based on questionable data (as admitted by one 
of its key architects in a private seminar at Glasgow University) this hasn’t prevented the 
                                                 
21 Department of Culture, Media and Sport,  Creative Industries Mapping Document  
(London: Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 1998) 1. 
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rampant process of diffusion of ideas – for instance, to China and the European Union, 
and through the United Nations.22  
 
The UK is has been a key ideas factory for the creative industries and creative 
economy discourses now being distributed globally – and these ideas are not only 
sweeping up enthusiastic adherents but also provoking increasing opposition and critique 
both in Europe and north America. 
 
UK creative industries policy has been a political project closely related to the 
‘policy generation’ at the heart of New Labour in government. Think tanks and other 
forms of expertise, such as that provided by policy advisers and sympathetic industry 
figures, have contributed significantly to shaping the cultural policy process, as is 
common in many fields. Key individuals have moved from advocacy in think tanks into 
positions of strategic influence in the Prime Minister’s office, the Department of Culture, 
Media and Sport and other ministries, the communications regulator, Ofcom, and the 
BBC. They have shaped the policy framework in practice.  
 
If we restrict ourselves to the fields of culture and communication, a number of 
individuals (doubtless unknown to an international readership) illustrate the point. James 
Purnell became Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, with an earlier stint as a 
junior minister, on both occasions influencing creative industries policy. While his time 
at the DCMS was short-lived, his thinking was in part shaped by time spent working in 
the think-tank, IPPR, and as a policy adviser at the BBC. On leaving government in 2009, 
Purnell renewed his think-tank connections. His successor as Secretary of State, Andy 
                                                 
22 KEA European Affairs, The Economy of Culture in Europe. Prepared for the European 
Commission, Directorate General of Education and Culture, 2006. 
ec.europa.eu/culture/key-documents/doc873_en.htm; Michael Keane, Created in China: 
The Great New Leap Forward (London and New York, 2007); UNCTAD, Creative 
Economy Report 2008. UNCTAD/DITC/2008/2, 
www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditc20082cer_en.pdf  
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Burnham, who also had a short period at the DCMS, similarly had a background as a 
New Labour policy adviser, and oversaw the publication of the UK Government’s 
Creative Britain policy statement.23 Ed Richards, who became chief executive of Ofcom, 
had been head of strategy at the BBC, moving on to advise Prime Minister Tony Blair, 
and like Burnham and Purnell, played a role in drafting the far-reaching Communications 
Act 2003. Richards’ predecessor as chief executive of Ofcom, Stephen Carter, 
subsequently became Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s chief of strategy, moving on from 
this to enter the House of Lords and, as a minister, pilot New Labour’s blueprint for a 
‘digital Britain’. As the creative economy and the digital economy have become 
increasingly hard to disentangle, whether as discourses or policies, the impact of this 
group (along with other key figures) in sustaining an agenda seems incontrovertible.24 
 
Those who became leading players through the London-based think tanks 
clustered around New Labour, mutating into policy advisers or consultants, operated 
within elite circles where the costs of entry to knowledgeable policy discussion are high 
and therefore inherently exclusionary. Usually, attendance at top universities (mostly 
Oxbridge), early association with the Labour Party’s ‘modernising’ drive, time spent in 
the worlds of policy advice and/or management consultancy, and extensive exposure to 
cultural and communications policy and strategy issues have been this group’s common 
characteristics.  
 
The terms of British policy discourse on the creative industries and the creative 
economy have become compelling. Not to buy into these frameworks is tantamount to 
self-dismissal from policy debate. Cultural and communications industries designated 
‘creative’ have been hailed as the driving force of a new economy and a rival in 
                                                 
23 Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Creative Britain: New Talents for the New 
Economy (London: Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2008). 
24 For more detail see Schlesinger, ‘Creativity and the experts’, op.cit. 8-11. 
 14
importance to the financial sector.25 The evidence for claims made about the scale of the 
creative sector is open to question.26 That said, the sheer pervasiveness of creativity 
discourse as a liquid synonym for dynamism, growth, talent formation and national 
renewal is quite remarkable. Herein lies its attractiveness as a development ideology 
adaptable to many different kinds of regime and economic condition. It resonates with the 
‘new spirit of capitalism’ embedded in management theory, recently analysed by Luc 
Boltanski and Ève Chiapello.27 It is fundamentally rooted in beliefs about how to manage 
cultural labour in conditions of global economic competitiveness.  
 
A key issue for future research into intellectual elites, therefore, is better to 
understand the sources of such policy arguments and the perspectives of those who 
advocate them. Contrary to Zygmunt Bauman, some intellectuals do still seek legislative 
power. They aren’t just interpreters. For such actors, know-how - and particularly, 
personal connections - are key to the actual exercise of influence and sometimes even 
governmental power. The scramble for intellectual dominance means that at any one 
time, there are preferred suppliers of ideas and evidence in a policy field. So far as the 
creative economy is concerned, unless academics are prepared to be largely uncritical 
advocates of dominant ideas, their ability to influence arguments is severely limited.  
 
Policy dependency 
If dominant ideas about cultural policy prevail at the centre, they also do so on the 
periphery. Apart from circling the globe, British creative economy doctrine has also 
                                                 
25 The Work Foundation, Staying Ahead: the Economic Performance of the UK’s 
Creative Industries (London: The Work Foundation 2007).  
26 Larry Elliott and Dan Atkinson, Fantasy Island: Waking up to the incredible economic, 
political and social illusions of the Blair legacy (London: Constable & Robinson Ltd, 
2007) 
27 Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism (London and New 
York: Verso, 2007). 
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hopped over the border to deeply inform Scottish government thinking about how to 
reshape a key cultural agency.  
 
Scotland is a ‘stateless nation’ of just over 5 million inhabitants in a UK state of 
some 60 million. For some political nationalists, stateless nationality suggests a 
teleological aspiration: that the nation ultimately needs to have a state - what Ernest 
Gellner once called a ‘political roof’28 – and that growing the requisite carapace is both 
desirable and necessary. From this perspective, not to have a state is a structural 
shortcoming. However, stateless nationhood is marked not only by a lack. Whatever the 
stateless nation’s political status may be, its self-identity as a nation is also entails the 
recognition of a special status, based in the existence of a distinctive socio-cultural space 
and often a specific institutional complex that chronically reproduces distinctiveness.  
 
European stateless nations typically have a complex public sphere. Indeed, rather 
than constituting a single public sphere, a stateless nation such as Scotland is more likely 
to be situated in an overlapping dual public sphere. That is because ideal-typically, the 
stateless nation has its own cultural institutions and media, and often a widely-used 
language that differs from the lingua franca of the state. Under non-repressive conditions, 
even where there is no separate indigenous system of representative politics, there is 
likely to be a distinct administrative apparatus, bound into that of the wider state and 
endowed with some autonomous powers in recognition of the identity claims of stateless 
nationhood. Inhabitants of stateless nations are therefore routinely exposed to their own 
national public sphere - the local, intimate and proximate – as well as being situated in 
the communicative space of the more distant state itself. Such a simple dual public sphere 
model exposes the fact that while there might be considerable convergence between the 
operations of the stateless national and central state public spheres, there is also room for 
dislocation, divergence and contradiction, as well as for disputes about boundaries, 
competencies and resources. The contingent set of relations between the stateless nation 
                                                 
28 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell 1983). 
 16
and the wider state is significantly shaped and channelled by the political-institutional 
framework in place. 
 
For these reasons, in stateless nations, the functioning of the domains of culture 
and communication may be particularly complex. It is obvious that these will be areas of 
crucial concern as national identity (expressed and represented through the gamut of 
cultural practices and routinely sustained through media of communication, educational, 
sporting and arts institutions and wider associational life in civil society) is routinely 
debated and flagged in stateless nations. Much, therefore, depends on the nature of the 
autonomy afforded the stateless nation – for instance, the extent to which it may pursue a 
distinctive cultural policy ranging from the traditional arts to digital communications. 
Such autonomy is in any case likely to be periodically renegotiated in line with shifting 
power relations between the stateless nation and the central state. Following this model, 
therefore, it is essential to understand how all levels of the polity work and how they 
interact, in order to analyse the lines of domination and subordination and to assess the 
scope and limits of policy intervention.  
 
The dependency relation between UK and Scottish policy making is particularly 
clear in the Scottish Government’s project to establish a new cultural agency called 
Creative Scotland, which combines two existing bodies, the long-established Scottish 
Arts Council and the younger Scottish Screen. Creative Scotland has been some time in 
the making. A Draft Culture (Scotland) Bill to set it up was first published in December 
2006 by the Labour-Liberal Democratic coalition cabinet. But the elections of May 2007 
intervened before a Culture Act could be passed in the Scottish Parliament, and then the 
SNP formed the new, minority Scottish Government. Once in power, the SNP adopted 
Creative Scotland and launched its own much-simplified Creative Scotland Bill in March 
2008. Meantime, Scottish Screen and the Scottish Arts Council enjoyed a kind of 
organisational half-life, with their own boards dissolved, but with some members from 
each combining to form a joint board of an organisation that still didn’t exist. The SNP 
government’s Creative Scotland Bill was defeated in the Scottish Parliament in June 2008 
and the plans have had to be recast. At this time of writing, Scottish Screen and the 
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Scottish Arts Council still exist but the new Creative Scotland is supposed to be 
established in Spring 2010, should the Public Services Reform Bill 2009, presently before 
the Scottish Parliament, be passed.  
 
One day, someone will write an entertaining book or thesis on this less than 
glorious exercise in setting up devolved Scotland’s new strategic cultural institution. My 
sketch of an incomplete story underlines the unreflective nature of Scottish cultural 
policy making, which in an area of clear and undisputed autonomy has straightforwardly 
adopted thinking made in London. 
 
Creative Scotland is the unloved child of two ill-matched parents: bureaucracy 
and intellectual dependency. The idea originated during the much-mooted ‘bonfire of the 
quangos’ in 2003, when the then Labour culture minister proposed one cultural agency to 
replace two, with no really good grounds, given their different remits. This idée fixe 
entered the civil service bloodstream of the Scottish Executive and subsequently was 
never seriously questioned. Why Creative Scotland? ‘Creativity’ was then – as now - in 
the air. Lacking originality, and any independent intellectual test-bed, Scottish Labour 
imported New Labour policy and terminology, without altering a comma or full stop. The 
paternity suit, therefore, needs to be filed against the coalition Labour-Liberal 
Democratic Scottish Executive.  
 
But the somewhat reluctant mother of this invention will be the present SNP 
Scottish Government. Why did the Nationalists in power not think again? Like the 
predecessor coalition, the present cabinet simply adopted policy made in London without 
critical reflection. The New Labour creative economy growth story certainly appealed to 
Alex Salmond, the SNP First Minister, inflecting his government’s broadcasting policy 
towards seeking an increase in Scotland’s share of UK television production.29 Creative 
                                                 
29 Philip Schlesinger, ‘The SNP, Cultural Policy and the idea of the “Creative 
Economy”’, pp. 135-146 in Gerry Hassan, ed. The Modern SNP: from politics to 
power   (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009). 
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Scotland’s long gestation period opened up a playground for consultants schooled in 
creative industries thinking to reinforce the existing path dependency. Where there was 
opposition to the proposal, this came most significantly from cultural producers focused 
on fears that a merger would have an adverse impact on their funding opportunities. 
Although as each Bill trundled through Parliament, the usual round of consultation with a 
range of interested parties took place, this did not have any noticeable impact on the 
underlying conception of the project. In short, no more than Scottish Labour did the 
Nationalists operate in an intellectual ecology capable of offering a robust challenge, or 
to imagine an alternative way of doing things. The framing ideas of Creative Scotland, 
eventually published in February 2009, were a word-for-word reiteration of the DCMS’s 
conception of creative industries, 1998 style – not even the reframed creative economy 
thinking of 2007 and after. Thirteen creative industries have been designated as such in 
Scotland because that’s what London decided was appropriate a decade or more ago. No 
doubt, the appropriateness of this line of thinking will be tested. 
 
Creative Scotland exemplifies an astonishing case of deep policy dependency, 
which has embraced the neo-liberal assumptions of the New Labour project just as these 
have been challenged by our profound financial and economic crisis. Looked at from a 
Scottish perspective, it would seem that policy dependency is at least in part linked to a 
weakness in the mobilisation of policy expertise. This can be attributed to a number of 
factors: a problem of capacity, stability and formation in the civil service; failures in the 
ability of the political class to make certain interconnections coupled with continual 
churn in holders of the culture brief; the absence of a policy ecology north of the border 
to match that of London - not in scale, of course, but at least in its range and political 
leverage. It now remains to be seen, as Scotland’s autonomy extends and deepens, 
whether it can develop the intellectual capacity to rethink the institutional relations 
between culture and politics. 
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